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BOOK REVIEW
EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION
By

HOWARD

J.

GRAHAM
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F

OR 35 years, Howard Jay Graham has labored to provide his
countrymen with a more accurate view of the purposes and scope
of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution. In this
collection of his essays, students of the Constitution can, for the first
time, fully grasp both the magnitude of his task and his extraordinary
achievement in laying bare truths which decades of mistaken scholarship have obscured.
The title of this collection, Everyman's Constitution, yields a key
to Graham's approach to constitutional interpretation. Decrying
"lawyer's history," which he regards as based on an overemphasis
of verbalisms and an excessive concentration on appellate decisions,
he stresses the dominant currents of thought which entered into our
constitutional heritage through the 14th amendment. For Graham
it is the stock of Lockean and Jeffersonian inspired natural rights
ideas, as articulated by the anti-slavery forces of the nation, which
dominated the thinking of the amendment's framers. These ideas
give us the most accurate insight into the purposes of the guarantees
of section one of the 14th amendment - privileges or immunities of
United States citizens, due process of law, and equal protection of
the laws.
Graham demonstrates in convincing fashion that the interpretation given the amendment by the United States Supreme Court from
the time of its adoption in 1868 until Brown v. Board of Education'
in 1954 was grossly erroneous. Provisions which were intended to
make newly emancipated blacks full fledged citizens, possessed of
the same rights as white American citizens, and free from all forms
of public discrimination by private or public agencies, were constricted into the narrowest possible compass. After stating in the
SlaughterhouseCases2 that the purposes of the 14th amendment were
the "freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House

Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him," 3 the Supreme Court proceeded in that
very opinion to draw a sharp distinction between state and national
citizenship, ignoring the framers' basic conception of a very broad
scheme of rights enjoyed by all United States citizens. By reducing the
privileges and immunities clause to a virtual nullity in Slaughterhouse.
the Court left due process and equal protection to carry the burden.
In the Civil Rights Cases,4 the Court then destroyed the fifth section
of the amendment, authorizing Congress to enforce the amendment's
other sections, by holding invalid the Civil Rights Act of 1875,5
which had sought to protect accommodation and other public rights
of blacks. According to the Court, Congress had power only to set
aside discriminatory state acts.' This was a conclusion wholly at
variance with the framers' intentions. Finally, by upholding classifications based on race under the deceptive guise of "separate but equal
facilities," the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson7 gave judicial sanction to
the very type of discrimination that the post-war. amendments were
intended to prevent. The great political compromise of 1877 saw
the Court moving in step with the Congress and President Hayes to
bury the past and appease the South at the expense of black citizens,
who, decade by decade, had seen their dream of a better life
smashed by new political and social forces, and sanctified by judicial
writ. It is one of the magnificent ironies of our constitutional history
that amendments designed to wipe out slavery, the least American
of institutions, could so easily meet destruction at the hands of
"realists," both on and off the Court.
Another grand theme in Graham's studies is his explanation
and clarification of the development of economic due process in the
post-war era. For several decades it was alleged and widely believed
that the framers of the post-war amendments had conspired to protect
the growing corporate enterprises of the nation, and that this objective
had been more prominent in their thinking than giving any real
assistance to black citizens. This false conclusion derived from the
celebrated argument of Roscoe Conkling - a prominent ex-Senator
and member, in 1860, of the joint committee of Congress which
drafted the 14th amendment - on behalf of the railroad in County
of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R.R.' In that case Conkling pro3

1d. at 71.

4United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5

Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
7 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
6
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duced, for the first time, the manuscript journal of the committee,
and, as Graham concludes, "by means of extensive quotations and
pointed comment [Conkling] conveyed the impression that he and
his colleagues in drafting the due process and equal protection clauses
intentionally used the word 'person' in order to include corporations."' By 1886 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition without
argument. Graham shows that Conkling was incorrect, or, to be
blunt, had deceived the Court by misusing the journal. In a masterful
and intensive examination of pre-war legal writings and decisions,
the author shows that due process and equal protection concepts as
generalized expressions for protecting persons and property were
well-recognized and fed into the post-war streams of thought without
the existence of any Congressional "conspiracy" in the drafting of
the 14th amendment. Corporations, as legal persons, or as legal
representatives of shareholders, could assert as naturally as individual
litigants the guarantees against arbitrary governmental action- i.e.,
due process or equal protection rights - in a nation so deeply
devoted to the business ethic as is the United States. What seemingly
gave support to the conspiracy theory was the fact that the decline
in legal support for black citizens was paralleled by the elevation of
economic due process in the period 1890-1936.
This brief summary is wholly inadequate in conveying the
breadth and richness of Graham's research. He is indeed, as Leonard
W. Levy states in a highly perceptive forward, "surely the greatest
authority on the history of the amendment. He is its Maitland, and
perhaps our foremost living historian of American constitutional law
as well."' Among the most engaging features of this work, are the
introductory and appended statements which the author supplies for
each essay. They furnish a running account of his intellectual pilgrimage which commenced in the 1930's, and they allow him to take
account of later research. What is striking is the high degree of
accuracy of all of his original investigations, the meticulous attention
to factual evidence, and his ability to prove or disprove hypotheses
by using rigorous methods of analysis.
But there is more to Mr. Graham's work than historical detection
of the highest quality. He is deeply devoted to the highest values in
American life, past and present. He sees legal, social, and political
events not as discrete examples of human success and failure, but as
reflections of the very nature of a people and their culture. He
rejoices when good triumphs and is saddened by the victories of
immoral or thoughtless men. Who else could take the subject of
frontier tax titles and in two chapters (11, 12) bring vividly alive
9 H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 30 (1968).

10 Id. at vii.
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the rich and varied strands of economic and social life in nineteenth
century frontier communities. There is even a "hero," - the virtually
forgotten Robert S. Blackwell, whose 1855 treatise on tax titles11
became a bible for lawyers and judges of that era, and contributed
greatly to Judge Thomas M. Cooley's own great treatise'" which
advanced the cause of due process limits on governmental action.
Philosophically, Howard Jay Graham belongs to that group
of historians who see man not as a toy or puppet in the hands of
government or other quasi-public organization, but rather, in the
American tradition, as a potentially noble creature already possessed
of an extensive range of rights, with new ones constantly being
discovered as the conditions of his life and environment change. The
need for imposing due process standards on those conducting the
affairs of large corporations and labor unions is the plea that closes
his book. He would, I am certain, applaud the growing effort to
bring due process into student-institutional relations in our universities. He would, I presume, approve of the Supreme Court's discovering a right of privacy in a Constitution which to Justice Black's
judicial eyes, contained no mention of privacy. It is in this sense that
the Constitution is, and as Graham proclaims must be, "everyman's,"
a living document shaped, and reshaped by each generation in
the hope of strengthening the lives and values of a free people.
William M. Beaney*

11 R. BLACKWELL, TREATISE ON TAX TITLES (1855).
12
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868).
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